The Battalion left Louez at 7.45 p.m. on "Z" night, 5th April, 1917 and reached the assembly trenches in November and December Avenues without incident. All being in position by midnight. The men were served out and the cooks left the trenches at 2.0 a.m. "zero" was 5.30 a.m [6^th]. The Battalion proceeded to take up its new position in the old "6" assembly trenches. The communication trenches were very muddy and a fairly heavy barrage was being put down by the enemy, his shooting on the trenches being very accurate. Progress was very slow but by 9.0. a.m. all Companies were in their new position, and two Strong points established in trench 60. Capt. Paul was wounded during this period, and 2nd. Lieut. R.R. Clowes took over command of "B" Company. From 7.0 a.m. to 10.0 a.m. the "6" trenches were continually shelled by 5.9 guns and gas shells. Respirators had to be worn. I was not in telephone communication with anyone during this period. At 9.30 a.m. orders were received to advance to the Blue Line preparatory for the attack on the Brown Line. Considerable delay in getting in settling the Battalion out of the trenches, chiefly owing to the deep mud, but by 10.15 a.m. all were clear of the assembly trenches and on their way to the Blue Line in artillery formation across the open. The enemy were shelling the open fairly continuously, but their fire was always directed on the same places, and the Battalion had no difficulty in picking their way through the barrage, and suffered no casualties. Progress was very slow owing to the ground being very much cut up, and the going extremely heavy.

Before reaching the Joke Line I foresaw that the Battalion would not reach the Blue Line much before midday. I therefore issued orders to push on as rapidly as possible to the Blue Line, and to attack on the Brown Line at 12.15 p.m. in accordance with the operation orders previously issued. The Battalion was within orders for the attack. The Battalion reached the Blue Line shortly before noon, and by twelve o'clock all were in position ready for the attack, leaving a quarter of an hour to rest.

This advance was extremely well done and direction excellently kept, the Companies arriving through exactly on their jumping off positions.

At this time the situation on the flanks was not good. There was a gap on the right between the incoming and the 15th Royal Scots, which was chiefly caused by the small numbers of the latter Battalion - there did not appear to be more than a hundred men. The left flank was also unsupported, and it was not till shortly before the attack was due to commence that the 100th Brigade revealed the Blue Line.

At 12.15 p.m. the Battalion advanced close under the barrage to the attack on the Brown Line. Direction was fairly well kept, but there was a tendency to edge off to the right owing to our having to fill the gap between ourselves and the 15th Royal Scots.

The leading Companies reached the Joke Line at 12.45 p.m. having encountered no opposition and only intermittent shelling. At this point, however, they came under point blank fire from a battery (Field Guns) at B.17.c.1.1. There was also some enfilade fire from the front, and also from the left rear, and some casualties were sustained. The advance then proceeded very slowly (N.C.O.s the time there was reported to be 70 feet thick and totally uncut. The advance was held up and the men had to lie down while parties were formed to deal with it. Progress was wounded during this period. There was practically no opposition from the enemy in this line, except from the snipers. The prisoners were very taken.

By the time this had cut the barrage was a long way ahead, and the two leading Companies had got hopelessly mixed up.

As soon as they had got through the wire the advance was continued, and the line of trenches from the Point du Jour along the track was soon in our possession without any serious opposition from the enemy. Lieut. W.F.Coote, 2nd. Lieut. W.Mattison and 2nd. Lieut. Allender were all wounded at this period. It is probably impossible to say what time we were established in this line, but it was somewhere between 2.0 and 2.30 p.m.

The two leading Company Commanders, Lieut. W.F.Coote and 2nd. Lieut. Gillender, both died almost immediately after being hit, and the commands passed to Cpl. Harding and 2nd. Lieut. Axbridge respectively.

During the advance from the Joke Line our own guns were shooting short and we had a number of casualties from them.

After getting established in the Point du Jour Line the enemy made a feeble attempt to counter-attack, but was easily repulsed. Valuable assistance was rendered by a Lewis gun team of the Northumberland Fusiliers who had established themselves in the Platoon. Gas shells were also used by the enemy. Respirators were worn and there were no casualties. Touch was maintained with the front line on the 15th Royal Scots on the right, and the 100th. Brigade on the left, but the situation in the support Companies was not very clear. The 15th Royal Scots had evidently all gone through to the Point du Jour Line, but I was in touch with the 27th Brigade on the road on the right. The left was unsupported.

The Battalion had lost direction considerably towards the end and had gone too far to the right, the left section about the centre of 11.1, considerable numbers of the 102nd. Brigade were also settling the Brown Line established. Great difficulty was experienced in getting FOUR LINE and establishing. There were few troops in the Point du Jour the enemy snipers were still causing casualties. Some of the 102nd. Brigade evidently saw light. Correct and were established in the gun pits 300 yards in front of the track. However, a temporary Brown Line was formed about 500 yards in front of the track which linked up with the 102nd. Brigade on the left, and extended south to the main road, where the 15th Royal Scots had established an advanced position.

About 7.0 p.m. the enemy were reported advancing in the valley in front, but no counter-attack ever showed signs of developing. The night was quiet and the enemy's snipers withdrew. All the lines were consolidated during the night and by next morning a good defensive position had been established.

Great difficulty was experienced in getting information from the front during the advance from the Blue Line to the Brown Line, and it was not till after 4.0 p.m. that I had definite information that the Brown Line was confirmed, after which Battalion Headquarters moved forward to the Brown Line and were established in the Joyous Lines.

During the evening the 15th Royal Scots went up to the Brown Line and on the morning of the 10th I assumed command of all the troops in the Brown and Joyous Lines.

Our total casualties up to this period were two Officers killed, 5 wounded, and about 100 other ranks.

The situation on the morning of the 10th was as follows. The right was held by the 15th Royal Scots, two Companies between the Brown and Green Lines, with two Companies in support in the Joyous - Jolly Line. The 100th Lincolns were on the left in a similar formation, with the left resting about the centre of H.J. The 102nd. Brigade were on the left still in the 101st Brigade area. The 16th Royal Scots were in support in the Jewel - Jenny LINE.

During the morning I received instructions from Brigade Headquarters to take up our proper front, and was also informed that the 102nd. Brigade had received orders to side slip to the left and get into their own area. I accordingly re-allotted the fronts of the 15th Royal Scots and 100th Lincolns, easing off to the left, and ordered the 16th Royal Scots to take over the left from the left of the Lincolns to where the Brown Line crossed FORTY NINE. Two Companies were to hold the front line and two in support. Evidently the 102nd. Brigade had not received any orders about taking over their own area, as when first orders telegraphed next morning to take up his new position he found the 102nd. Brigade still there and with no intentions of moving. I reported this to Brigade Headquarters and ordered the 16th Royal Scots and 102nd. 10th to remain in support in Jemmy till further orders. The 102nd. Brigade remained in our area till the following day.

During the day the Vickers guns (*) were re-adjusted and 2 Stoke's guns came up and were allotted positions to be occupied in case of attack.

The 10th was quiet except for shelling, the chief objectives being the Green Line, Point du Jour, and the support line. The Haystacks were also continually shelled. Patrols were pushed out throughout the day, but failed to get in touch with the enemy although they were seen in large numbers on the Cavalry - Britannia area.

About 7.0 p.m. I was informed that the 102nd. Brigade on the left were being considerably worried and a similar report was received about one of the Brigades on the right. I ordered all Battalions to "stand to" but everything was perfectly quiet on our front, and at 8.15 p.m. Battalions "stood down". During the night of the 10th/11th a new enemy zone was put in advance of the old one, giving a more satisfactory field of fire. Touch was maintained with the Brigade on the right but communication was rather obscure. I compiled a Patrol to go in advance of the Battalion and early in the morning they reported on the right and found out that they had an outpost line considerably in advance of our Green Line. He did not get in touch with this line till the following day. The remainder of the night was very quiet.

During the morning a considerable increase of hostile shelling, and this was continued throughout the day. There were a considerable number of casualties to all Battalions. Patrols were out all day and pushed out in support encountering the enemy. During the day orders were received altering the dispositions. The 102nd. Brigade were to move out of our area and occupy their own front, the 15th Royal Scots were to occupy a narrower front facing north in 12.D.V, while the 16th Royal Scots are 100th Lincolns side slipped to the left and Battalions gap in the Green and Brown Line, getting in touch with the 102nd. Brigade who now moved north to their own front north of T.OPR. This move was completed by midnight 11th/12th, and definite touch was established with the outpost troops of the Brigade on our right (East Kents).

The enemy continued shelling our trenches throughout the night. Our own artillery - which was silenced the enemy's guns - otherwise the night was normal.

There was nothing particular to report on the 12th. Hostile shelling continued throughout the day, and about 5.30 p.m. a barrage was put on the Brown Line. This was probably caused by the Division on our right who were bringing up ammunition, and the extra movement had been noticed by the enemy.

During the day I received orders from the Brigade to relieve the 16th Royal Scots in the Joke Line. I accordingly divided the two reserve Companies of the 15th Royal Scots to relieve the two right Companies of the 16th Royal Scots while the two reserve Companies of the 10th Lincolns relieved the two left Companies. This relief was completed without incident by 10.0 p.m. The 16th Royal Scots becoming support to the whole line.

The remainder of the night passed without incident.

The situation on the 13th was unchanged, and the hostile shelling had decreased. During the night of the 12th/13th I received instructions that the 11th Suffolks would take over the whole of the front system. This relief was carried out partly by day and partly by night. The support lines were relieved by day in small parties, while the relief of our own Lines were relieved after dark. The whole relief was completed by 11.0 p.m. without incident, and I handed over the front system to Lieut. Colonel Forestier, 11th Suffolks. The 10th Lincolns went into dugouts in the Blue Line on the night of the 13th/14th, the 15th Royal Scots being relieved by the 14th they were relieved on the afternoon of the 14th they were rolled to Billets in Maizieres. All were reported in billets in Maizieres by 1.0 a.m. on the night of the 14th/15th, not a single man falling out.

The weather from the 7th to the 14th was extremely bad with heavy snowstorms, and bitterly cold. The trenches were very deep in mud and all Battalions suffered considerably from exposure.

2^nd Lt A G R Clark and 2^nd Lt L R Taylor were wounded on the 9th