Report on Operations Page 2

September 28^th 1918

Battalion marched at 4.15am arriving at assembly position east of High Trees in F.1.b close behind 17th Battalion at Zero minus 10 minutes. The officer in charge of the machine gun battery attached to the 44th battalion reported to me on the assembly position at Zero fan stated that his battery had not yet arrived but was coming up in rear. I outlined to him the probable tasks and asked him to follow on.

Barrage opened promptly at Zero and was well defined. Battalion moved off in artillery formation Nos 1 and 3 Companies in front, No 2 and 4 Companies in support. Lieut Leighton with scout patrol instructed to maintain liaison with 3rd Division unit on our right, throughout. The advance progressed without opposition until reaching Raillencourt.

Report on Operations Page 3

It had been arranged that the battalion would pass to the South of Raillencourt, defiling through the gully in column of companies changing direction according to 10^th Brigade line of advance and passing through Sailly deploying again to the previous attack formation when clear of that village. This difficult movement was carried out in splendid style. Heavy resistance was met with in Sailly from enemy machine gun nests but battalion swept through the Marcoing Line and through the village without a check, reforming quickly on the line of the light railway in X.30.a and 29.b. This line was reached at 8.00am.

At this time large parties of the enemy were retiring in confusion from the area in front of the battalion. Officers were seen attempting to rally their men without success. Our Lewis Gunners opened fire from the hip with good effect on these parties of the Battalion moved forward. It was soon notest that some isolated enemy machine guns but firing from the right flank and shortly afterwards it was found that no troops of the 3^rd Division we're advancing on that flank having been held up short of the Marcoing Line to the south of Arras-Cambrai Road. The Battalion was halted at once and took up align running through X.24.c central with the flanks approximately on the N.W and S.E corner of that square. Parties were at once set to work clearing out machine gun nests on the right and left. This work was taken on in fine style by Platoon Commanders I know difficulty was experienced in effectively clearing enemy posts. Trench line in X.24.a was cleared as far as X.24.a. central.

Shortly after the battalion finally halted, a battery of the 4^th C.M.G Battalion reported to major Martin who placed them to cover our forward line. These guns were very largely responsible for stopping enemy counter attacks. No touch was obtained on either flank but the 47th battalion was in good support positions on the Trench Railway in X.29.b & 30.a Auto organised in depth behind. At this time Battalion Headquarters was established near the church in Sailly. When, however, it was found that the vicinity of quarry at X.20.c while still occupy strongly by the enemy and that the R.C.R had been stopped at the Marcoing Line, headquarters was moved over to X.25.d.8.2 on the Arras-Cambrai Road in order to maintain touch with the units of the 3^rd Division and endeavour to arrange cooperation.

About 9.00am going through the Marcoing Line I found it empty north of the Arras-Cambrai Road. Meeting a company commander of the P.P.C.L.I who had been detailed with his company to obtain talks with our flank, I explained the situation following which he worked up into the South-Eastern part of Sailly under stablished posts facing South-East which were later connected up with the 47th Battalion right flank by the supporting Platoons of the 47th battalion.

Report on Operations Page 4

At 10.00am a message was received from Major Martyn  who had established Advanced Headquarters at X.20.b.50.70 giving situation and reporting the capture of between 50 and 100 prisoners including a Regimental Commander in a large dugout at X.29.b.10.95.  

From 10.00am forward the enemy reaction began against their right and left flanks, four attacks being beaten off during the morning. Large parties of the enemy were seen moving up beyond the Cambrai-Douai Road. This information was transmitted to the 10th brigade headquarters with a request for strong artillery action and diversity of the Cambrai-Douai Road. Forward units complained that this request was not responded to for some hours. At 2.00pm the enemy had given up all attempts to attack and have retired beyond the Cambrai-Douai Road which was again seen massing troops behind that line.

At 3.30pm a strong and well organised enemy attack was delivered against our forward line but was effectively broken up by Vickers and Lewis Gun fire. At 5.00pm a strong enemy party supported by direct Minenwerfer fire worked behind our right flank along a sunken Rd and forced our men to withdraw to the railway in X.30.a. At 7.00pm I counter attack organised by Major Martyn fully reestablished our positions being immediately attacked again by strong enemy party who were effectively driven off.

At 7.00 having learned from Lieutenant Leighton, liaison officer at Headquarters, P.P.C.L.I battle attack would be delivered by the 7th brigade at 7.00pm I went forward to watch its progress. A scout of the 44th Battalion who accompanied the attack reported to me that the P.P.C.L.I had gained ground on the left and were in touch with the 47th Battalion right flank at X.30.a.4.5 but that's on the right had been seriously held up by enemy wire and machine gun fire.

At about 9.00pm the brigade major, 10^th C.I.B cold up and stated that the 7th brigade reported having passed the Cambrai-Doulai Road And reached the railway line in S.?.d. This was contrary to my own information. I however decided to recognise her the forward line and if apparently feasible to attack and occupy the Cambrai-Doulai Road. On visiting the line I found that no touch had been obtained on the left, but that the whole of the trench system in X.24.a & 18.c was held by our men also that we were in touch on the right with the P.P.C.L.I who had visited our Posts. All appeared quiet on the front occasional flares coming from about S.20.c.20.95. After consulting with Major D B Martyn I proceeded to 46 battalion headquarters to learn their positions and on his return took the battalion forward to the Cambrai-Doulai Road.

Report on Operations Page 5

This was completed by 3.00am, a heavy belt of wire being encountered running along the road on the West side. Buildings in S.20.d were cleared and several machine guns captured. Enemy outpost line retired towards railway which appeared to be their main line of resistance. Major Martyn organised align running from S.20.c.5.7 to S.10.b.7.1, no touch on either flank.

By this time only 199 men were available outside of Signals, Headquarters and Scouts, 2 Officers only remained unwounded in the Companies and 3 Sergeants still available for duty. Information was received at 3.00am of the attack by the 12^th Brigade to be delivered at 5.00am together with initial barrage line.

Casualties:                    Officers         Other Ranks
Killed                                 4                     17
Wounded                           5                    152
Missing                             0                      45
Wounded at Duty               1                       0